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THE CIVILISING TENSION AT THE HEART OF MARKET-MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF 
THE STENT INDUSTRY 
ABSTRACT 
We are interested in the emergence of new markets.  While the literature contains various perspectives on 
how such new markets come to be, the dynamics of the marketization process are less clear.  This paper 
focuses on the development of stent technology and examines the activities characteristic of its emerging 
market.  We identify four market ‘moments’: a mutable marketing moment prior to the point of 
disruption; two parallel moments at the point of disruption – internecine marketing between emergent 
competitors, and subversive marketing between those competitors and established actors; and finally, a 
civilized marketing moment. We conclude that emergent competitors operate two distinct strategies at the 
point of disruption.  Also, legal activities are central to marketization dynamics during this period.  In 
terms of process, while creative destruction may broadly describe the move from disruption to 
acceptance, there is a period of creative construction prior to disruption, when the new market is coming 
into being.   
Keywords: 
Market-making; civilized marketing; stent technology, legal activity, longitudinal case study; translation. 
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THE CIVILISING TENSION AT THE HEART OF MARKET-MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF 
THE STENT INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The question addressed in this paper is how new markets emerge and are constructed.  This immediately 
leads to further questions such as: What is a ‘new market’ and how does it differ from other markets?  Are 
new markets deliberately constructed, or do they emerge in an ad hoc fashion?  And what is the 
appropriate method to interrogate these broad questions?  
The reflexive, emergent nature of the phenomenon warrants a particular mode of inquiry.  Since 
marketization is an ongoing accomplishment – and even though any ‘market’ is worthy of study – studies 
of new markets, where new objects, actors, relationships and structures come to be, seem especially 
appropriate.  Moreover, market-making processes are probably best inquired into through in-depth, 
empirical, longitudinal case studies.  In particular, such studies should preferably collect data over an 
extended time period because the processes are unlikely to be apparent over short time horizons.   
This paper reports on a study of marketization processes associated with the emergence of stent 
technology, stents, corporate actors and markets. The research method adopted was a longitudinal case 
study, which we felt was an especially appropriate way of inquiring into the phenomenon.  Our 
perspective is influenced by Latour, Callon, Law and other actor-network contributors who advocate the 
detailed study of actions, over time, through which actors become powerful, and things – including 
markets – come to be (Latour, 1991; Callon, 1998).  Within such a setting, there are several units of 
analysis of interest, including the firm, industry, product and market.   
The relationships between these actors and entities have emerged as important in a range of literatures, for 
example, in terms of market-making (e.g. Araujo, 2007; Araujo, Finch and Kjellberg, 2010), competitive 
dynamics (e.g. Porter, 1979; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Das and Van de Ven, 2000; Beard, 2002; He et 
al, 2006) and the diffusion of new technologies (e.g. Rogers, 1962/1995; Davies, 1979; Robertson et al, 
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1996; Geroski, 2000; Dopson, 2005).  So to frame our project, we focused on a definable market.  Having 
considered different possibilities, we settled on a study of the stent market.   
Stents – small tubes, usually metallic – are ‘less-invasive’ medical technologies, delivered by flexible 
catheters, with balloons often used to expand them in the clogged arteries they are designed to help clear.  
Coronary stents, which frequently obviate the need for open-heart surgery, were first tested in humans in 
1986, commercially launched in the US in 1994, and were followed by drug-eluting stents (DES) – 
launched in 2003 in the US.  Our study examines the market-making processes (e.g. Fligstein, 1996; 
Rosa, et al, 1999; Harrison and Kjellberg, 2010) associated with this product.  As the characteristics of 
these processes were not clear, a priori, and as the primary focus of the research was the dynamics of 
these processes as the market developed, it was inappropriate to delineate the scope of the research in 
terms of possible characteristics such as scale or constitution.   
Defining a start point and duration for the market-making processes presented a particular challenge.  We 
utilise data from several decades prior to the patenting of the first balloon-expandable stent (in the USA) 
in 1985, until around the time when drug-eluting stents were introduced, in 2005.  Evidence is presented 
to illustrate how the stent product began to impact on an existing market – the coronary artery bypass 
graft (CABG) market – as this period progressed.  This situation represents the essence of Christensen’s 
concept of ‘the point of disruption’ (e.g. Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen 1997; Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003) in technological terms.   
Our actor-network approach meant that, rather than centering on one or other domain, we collected data 
on the product, the firms, the industrial context, the regulatory environment, related technologies, legal 
moves, and so forth.  Consequently, a large amount of data relating to marketization processes over time 
was collected and analyzed.  Our main data sources included the firms themselves, regulatory bodies, 
industry association publications, academic journals, and market reports.  For example, we accessed 
several years of financial data for each of the firms listed, as well as product information, previous case 
studies and newspaper articles.  We utilized several commercial, governmental, regulatory and academic 
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databases to construct a comprehensive record of events.  These included FDA data, the National Hospital 
Discharge Surveys in the US, industry reviews, medical device industry representative associations, and 
product-based and clinical sources.  
In addition, we conducted eight interviews with senior practitioners – both managerial and technical – in 
the industry, and two technical experts external to the industry.  These interviews occurred during a 
period of substantial turmoil in the industry, as the launch of the second-generation products was 
imminent.  As a result, it was difficult to gain access to the firms, and interviewees’ demeanours were 
frequently reserved.  Regardless, the interviews were useful in that they confirmed the issues of 
importance, facilitated an exploration of their details, and contributed to a more refined understanding of 
the case. 
The study followed an inductive approach (Locke, 2007) in that it induced theoretical concepts and 
relationships through repeated analysis and synthesis of the empirical data. 
Stent Market Case Overview 
Some diversified firms (e.g. Johnson & Johnson; Abbott Labs) have entered the stent market relatively 
recently in terms of their own histories, while others were established as medical device firms in the 
1950s and 1960s (e.g. Medtronic).  In contrast to established firms entering the market, some corporate 
entities (e.g. Boston Scientific, 1979; Guidant, 1994) were established specifically to compete in this 
market.  A summary of the dominant corporate entities in this market is provided below (see Table. 1, 
below).  The data represents a snapshot of the market at a relatively advanced stage – 2003 – when much, 
though not all of the market-making activities had taken place. 
----------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------- 
 6 
An important distinction in our research is between these emergent competitors (i.e. directly-competing 
stent producers) and established actors (i.e. wider market actors such as coronary surgeons, hospitals and 
regulatory authorities).  The emergent competitors all built on the work of technological advocates 
(doctors, engineers, entrepreneurs) who persisted – over several decades (see Fig.1, below) – in their 
determination to introduce this product.  Notable among these advocates were Dr. Werner Forssmann, 
who catheterized his own heart in 1929; Drs. Cournand and Richards, who used cardiac catheterization as 
a diagnostic tool in the US for the first time in 1941; Dr. Charles Dotter, who, in 1964, performed the first 
‘transluminal angioplasty’ (a less-invasive way of clearing blocked arteries using catheters, balloons and, 
later, stents); and Dr. Andreas Gruentzig, who in 1973 used a balloon for the first time to dilate human 
arteries, and who, in 1977, performed the same operation in a human coronary artery (with Hannah and 
Myler).  Peripheral stents (those used to clear arteries in limbs) were developed in the 1980s, while J&J 
launched the first coronary stent in the US in 1994, which was followed by competing coronary stents in 
1997. 
 ----------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------- 
In many cases, these coronary stents obviated the need for coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG – ‘heart 
bypasses’), and from 1995 onwards, although the CABG market continued to expand, the number of stent 
insertions (or ‘percutaneous trans-luminal coronary angioplasties’ – PTCA) per CABG also began to 
increase.  The potential disruption to the existing CABG market in this period is clearly illustrated in Fig. 
2 below.  J&J subsequently launched the first drug-eluting coronary stent (DES) in the US in 2003.  DESs 
were introduced to limit a difficulty called ‘restenosis’ which describes a negative reaction that may 
occur, in some cases, following a bare-metal stent (BMS) insertion procedure.  J&J held a monopoly 
position for approximately one year before competitors arrived into the DES market. 
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----------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------- 
By 2006, approximately 1.2 million stents were used annually in the US, with 652,000 angioplasties 
being performed – each of them requiring an average of 1.84 stents.  These stents were a mixture of bare-
metal and drug-eluting models and cost from less than $1,000, up to in excess of $3,000 each, implying a 
US stent market of more than $3 billion that year.  It is against this background of market development, 
technological progress and industry growth that this case is examined.   
Analytical Frame 
The primary focus of this research is on the dynamics involved in the emergence of a new market.  In that 
sense there are three time periods of concern: pre-market; new market, and established market.  Within 
these three time periods, we have identified four market ‘moments’.  The dynamics associated with the 
first of these – the pre-market phase – we will describe as mutable marketing.  Our examination of the 
subsequent new market phase revealed two parallel sets of market–making processes occurring during 
this period.  The first was between the emergent competitors, which we describe as internecine marketing 
due to its mutually aggressive nature.  The second was between emergent competitors and established 
actors such as regulatory authorities, surgeons, patent offices, and so forth.  We introduce the term 
subversive marketing to describe these dynamics as they tend to be far more subtle and diplomatic than 
those experienced between emergent competitors.  We describe our fourth market moment – that which 
represents what might be referred to as ‘normal’ or ‘stable’ marketing behaviour – as civilised marketing.  
An analytical framework involving these concepts is presented below in Table 2.  Each of these moments 
will now be discussed. 
----------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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----------- 
 
 
Mutable Marketing 
What distinguishes the mutable marketing moment is that, while market entities such as products, 
producers and consumers can be identified, at least retrospectively, no market exists at this time, meaning 
that economic activity, as usually understood, does not take place during this period.  A market requires 
rules, material artefacts, calculative devices, governance structures, and agreed understandings of what 
constitutes a traded object (Rosa et al, 1999; Finch and Geiger, 2011), a buyer, a seller and the like.  All 
of these ‘come to be’ during the market-making moment (Callon 1998, Araujo 2007).  The term ‘mutable 
marketing’ is not used to suggest that something that might be described as ‘real’ marketing only begins 
when this phase is complete.  Rather, it captures the idea that the prospective product associated with the 
market-that-might-come-to-be is under-developed, the actions that will come to be seen as market-making 
are unrelated, and the actors that will come to be seen as producers and consumers are only vaguely 
formed at this stage. Mutable marketing carries the sense that these entities are as yet unrevealed and the 
‘marketing’ activities are perhaps only understood as such retrospectively. During the mutable marketing 
moment, product advocates begin to perceive each other as potential future competing producers.  But 
before competition begins they absorb ideas, observe what product applications appear attractive, and 
consider potential opportunities.  For example, Dotter’s 1964 operation was imitated by Porstmann, Van 
Andel and Zeitler in Europe.  Zeitler passed on the angioplasty technique to Gruentzig, who substantially 
developed it.  Product advocates behaved similarly in business.  Bill Cook (Cook Inc.), Hugo Schneider 
(Schneider Inc.), John Abele (Boston Scientific) and Dick Myler (cardiologist) all met each other at trade 
fairs from the late 1960s and through the 1970s, which they attended both to promote their own 
innovations and to observe each other’s.  Alliances and potential market opportunities were considered 
and formulated between these actors.  In this phase these potential future competitors remained aware and 
tolerant of each other. 
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During this mutable marketing moment, the product remains exciting and new.  The primary challenge its 
advocates face is to prove that it works, rather than to compete with other producers.  The product moves 
from being entirely speculative to being proven in at least a single application.  This product-proving 
requirement leads to some interesting recklessness on the part of the producers.  For example, until 1929 
it was thought that positioning a catheter in the human heart would be fatal.  That year, Forssmann, 
refused permission to catheterise his own heart, induced a nurse to help him do so – then X-rayed himself 
to prove the catheter’s location (Kerridge, 2003).  He lost his job because of this recklessness, but 
subsequently shared the 1956 Nobel Prize for medicine for his efforts.   
In less reckless circumstances – but still experimental – Cournand and Richards used catheterization for 
the first time in a diagnostic capacity in the US in 1941, while in 1964 Dotter used catheters as an 
interventional tool for the first time, to save the foot of an 82 year old woman from amputation.  By 1969 
Dotter was experimenting with stents in dogs’ arteries, while others were experimenting with balloon 
dilation of human arteries.  In 1977, the first human coronary angioplasty was performed by a team 
including Dr. Gruentzig. 
It is feasible to believe that this recklessness was tolerated because the market remained so ill-defined and 
tentative.  In an environment lacking in appropriate tools and infrastructure even the most ethical and 
best-prepared producers must sometimes work with products barely sufficient to the circumstances.  
However, although these applications represent technological progress, the product remains unrevealed 
during this moment.  The product is not established, consumers are not widely aware of it, and even 
emergent competitors remain unclear about its eventual scope and capabilities.  Callon (1991, 1998) 
speaks of ‘immutable mobiles’ as those products that have been black-boxed, or have been stabilized and 
are capable of being traded.  Finch and Geiger (2011) reference ‘cool’ objects (Law and Singleton, 2005) 
and ‘objects as black boxes’ (Latour, 1987) in a similar context.  Our mutable marketing moment 
describes a phase prior to this stabilization, when the product remains ‘mutable’, and the activities – what 
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Harrison and Kjellberg (2010) describe as ‘investments’ – required to make it immutable, are still being 
made. 
While the investments Harrison and Kjellberg speak of are in market segmentation, the investments made 
by market actors in this case relate to the slow and gradual stabilization of a product so that it can be 
traded.  These investments included Forsmann’s self-catheterisation in 1929, the seventeen papers Dotter 
wrote in the four years after he pioneered the angioplasty process in 1964, the American Heart 
Association meetings that Gruentzig presented at – to lukewarm responses – and the clinic he opened in 
Zurich in 1978 in which he trained doctors from around the world, until in 1980 he was appointed 
Director of Interventional Cardiology at a major teaching hospital in the US where he carried on his 
product advocacy work. 
These were investments made by medical professionals, but parallel investments were being made by 
business entities.  John Abele and Peter Nicholas of Boston Scientific, and others, attended many trade 
fairs, promoting the technology and networking.  Meetings frequently occurred between Abele, Cook, 
Schneider and other advocates, both in the US and Europe.  These commercial entities developed many 
ways of promoting the technology including building briefcase-sized models of the human vascular 
system for demonstration purposes.  For Abele, these investments included once lecturing Harvard 
medical students on the PTCA method.   
These mutable marketing activities are important, because they help describe how the market comes to 
be.  In the stent market these activities occurred over decades, until in 1994 the first coronary stent was 
launched in the USA.  This is the point, we suggest, that the product stabilized and became capable of 
being traded.  Subsequently, different market ‘moments’ occurred. 
Internecine Marketing 
Internecine marketing describes how emergent competitors interact with each other in an emerging 
market, as distinct from how they interact with established actors.  In the stent case these relationships are 
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revealed as dramatically distinctive, with the emergent competitors exhibiting ruthless antagonism 
between themselves.   
Following J&J’s launch of the coronary stent in the US in 1994, Boston Scientific entered a 10 year, 
exclusive, worldwide licensing agreement with the Israeli stent manufacturer, Medinol, in 1995.  In 1997, 
Boston Scientific began covertly developing its own abilities to produce Medinol’s ‘NIR’ stents outside 
of these licensing terms.  Medinol subsequently sued Boston Scientific for breaching agreements, 
misappropriating intellectual property and fraudulently filing documents with the FDA1 in order to steal 
Medinol’s business and conceal the scheme.  In 2000, Boston Scientific conceded the existence of its 
reverse-engineered secret production line in Dublin, Ireland, claiming it was necessary because Medinol 
was such an unreliable supplier.  At the same time, James Tobin, Boston Scientific’s new CEO, stated 
that he was unaware he was involved with ‘such crooks’ and that he was ‘ashamed to represent such a 
dishonest company’2.  Following years of legal wrangling, Boston Scientific settled with Medinol in 
2005, for $750 million.  This activity is quite distinct from the strategic aspects of licensing examined in 
the literature (Brockhoff et al, 1999; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004). 
As Boston Scientific was building the secret line to produce NIR stents outside its licensing terms, it also 
signed a co-exclusive agreement with Angiotech, to use ‘Paclitaxel’, a promising drug in the battle 
against restenosis.  This was part of their development of drug-eluting stents.  Cook, another emergent 
competitor, was the other ‘co-exclusive’ signatory to the agreement. 
In 2001, Guidant, also wishing to develop a drug-eluting stent, signed an agreement with Cook to access 
Paclitaxel through that firm.  This agreement was described by one judge in a resulting court case – 
initiated by Boston Scientific – as a ‘sham’3.  Following this judgement, which restrained Guidant from 
accessing Paclitaxel through Cook, Guidant moved to acquire Cook.  In 2002, a subsequent judgement 
                                                 
1 http://sec.edgar-online.com/boston-scientific-corp/8-k-current-report-filing/2001/05/01/Section5.aspx (accessed 
13/4/12) 
2 ibid 
3 http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/business/companies/guidant/stories/2002_0803.html (accessed 
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prevented Guidant from benefiting from work done with Paclitaxel during the period of the previous 
‘sham’ agreement, even after Cook was acquired by Guidant.  Guidant appealed, lost and, in 2003, 
withdrew from the acquisition, citing poor clinical trial results for a Cook stent as the reason.  Table 3, 
below, provides a detailed summary of the associated clinical trials and the timing of the related actions.  
----------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------- 
Guidant was subsequently (2006) acquired by, and split between, Boston Scientific and Abbott Labs 
following an aggressive bidding war with J&J.  The ruthlessness required to engage in the fraud Boston 
Scientific was charged with, and to pursue access to complimentary technologies in the way that Guidant 
did, is driven by the need to acquire new product technologies.  The drive to acquire these technologies 
means that firms engage in acquisition drives which are intense and sustained.  A summary of the 
‘relationships’ (acquisitions, alliances, licensing agreements, etc.) entered into by the dominant 
competitors during the internecine marketing phase is presented below (see Fig. 3).  This pattern of 
ruthless acquisition partly defines how producers in emerging markets compete with each other. 
----------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------- 
The remarkable extent and scale of legal activities within the internecine marketing moment requires 
further examination as these sorts of activities – firms being sued for theft of technology, agreements 
being described by judges as shams, and ruthlessly acquisitive disputes – are not characteristic of 
competition in established industries.  A diagram of some of the primary legal actions (not exhaustive) for 
the stent market during this phase is provided below (see Fig. 4).  These legal actions are charted from 
1997 – the time the first competitor to J&J’s coronary stent is launched in the US – until 2005. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13/4/12); http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=20021082208FSupp2d874_1978.xml (accessed 13/4/12) 
 13 
----------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------- 
The frequency with which emergent competitors sue each other, the repetitive nature of many of these 
suits, the propensity firms have for suing more than one producer for similar alleged infractions, and the 
strong likelihood that an appeal will immediately follow a negative outcome are revealed as characteristic 
of the stent market.  This indicates that legal activity, in addition to being a principled response to 
infringements, is also a market-making lever of significant power.  Prime evidence of this was provided 
by the district court of The Hague in Holland, which in 2004 delivered the first ever ‘anti-suit’ injunction 
in Dutch legal history.  This injunction restrained Medinol from repeatedly suing other producers – on the 
basis of overlapping patents – with respect to issues that had already been decided.  The decision 
indicated that ‘when a party indulges in activity which can be characterised as an abuse of process, the 
court will take firm action.’4 
Litigation between emerging competitors in the stent market was not confined to these difficulties.  For 
years, producers sued each other repeatedly.  In November 2000, subsequent to a 1997 lawsuit, Medtronic 
was ordered to pay J&J $271 million in damages for patent infringements.  That December, Boston 
Scientific was ordered to pay J&J $324 million, also for patent infringements.  Both of these orders were 
immediately appealed, and in March 2002, the Medtronic penalty was overturned and the Boston 
Scientific payment was set aside.  Appeals and hearings followed in both cases.  In March 2005, J&J won 
both cases, again, only to have Medtronic and Boston Scientific appeal – again.  In January 2008, the 
courts heard the appeals and found in favour of J&J.  This resulted in judgements against Medtronic and 
Boston Scientific in October 2008 of $521 million and $703 million, respectively.  In June 2005, J&J had 
a different patent infringement suit against Boston Scientific judged in their favour, to the value of $844 
million.  This was countered by Boston Scientific’s successful June lawsuit against J&J in Holland, 
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through which the firm hoped to stifle European distribution of J&J stents (Holland being the European 
manufacturing site for J&J at the time).  In addition, a subsequent (US) judgement in July 2005 found that 
J&J stents infringed Boston Scientific patents.   
In many cases, individual judgements are used as opportunities to conclude a wider set of actions.  For 
example, in February 2002, Boston Scientific sued Medtronic in Germany claiming that the firm’s ‘rapid 
exchange’ stent delivery system infringed its patents.  In June, the German court agreed.  In September 
that year, this case, and a range of other lawsuits between the two firms were settled following a $175 
million damages payment from Medtronic.  As part of the agreement, other stent products were cross-
licensed between the firms, including abdominal aortic aneurysm repair and catheter manufacturing 
technologies.  This is one means by which emergent competitors and established actors within the market 
are translated. 
This series of lawsuits, appeals, counter- appeals and large penalties illustrates the ruthless and extensive 
nature of legal actions between producers.  In the period from 1994 to 2005, there were repeated legal 
jousts between firms, with several judgements, arbitration outcomes and settlements arrived at each year.  
The intensity and frequency of these legal battles is not experienced in more established industries and is 
characteristic of internecine marketing dynamics. 
These legal activities occur only between emergent competitors, and are not characteristic of the 
relationships between producers and consumers or other market entities.  They occur after the emergent 
competitors have begun establish themselves and they represent an important aspect of the character of 
emerging markets.  The legal dynamics between emergent competitors escalate in a way reminiscent of 
Rene Girard’s idea that an actor not only wants to be like another (the model), but also wants what the 
model has (Desmond and Kavanagh, 2003).  This leads to the development of ‘doubles’, who suffer ‘an 
intolerable sameness’ (Desmond and Kavanagh, 2003, p241), and thus become violently and mutually 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 See: http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Detail.aspx?r=9041 (accessed 13/4/12); 
http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj005/05_05/05_sup.pdf (p.190) (accessed 13/4/12) 
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antagonistic to each other.  These actors use the legal system as one of their most effective and frequently 
employed market-making levers, ruthlessly suing each other in the hope of destroying competing 
producers, delaying emergent competitors’ product launches, or extracting large settlements.  This 
ruthless and extensive legal activity is a dominant form of market-making engaged in by emergent 
competitors.  And it is market-making in the most fundamental sense: emergent competitors are forming 
the structure of the market (who and what is in it), rather than seeking competitive advantage within an 
already formed market (using price competition, for example).   
From a slightly different perspective, Schumpeter (1942/1976), Porter (1979, 1983), Rosenbloom (1985), 
Bower and Christensen (1995) and other contributors agree that there is a uniquely competitive process 
associated with the introduction of new products.  These legal activities are part of that unique character.  
Afterwards, when the market has been translated into something new – when it has become civilised – 
these legal activities are substantially less in evidence.  But at this moment – on the cusp of what 
Christensen (1997) might describe as the point of disruption – they are fundamental to the dynamics of 
the marketization process. 
Subversive Marketing 
The relationship between emergent competitors and established actors is far more subtle and emollient 
than the ruthless antagonism exhibited between emergent competitors.  The challenge faced by producers 
could be interpreted as how to establish a market without aggravating established actors.  Christensen and 
Raynor proposed that producers seeking to gain market share should ‘compete against non-consumption’ 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003, p.45), or enter parts of a market that are not currently being served by 
existing actors.  Clearly the distinction between establishing a new market and entering neglected areas of 
existing markets is a fine one.  We suggest that emergent competitors attempt to advocate their products, 
while appearing deferential to established actors.   
The move by the stent product from peripheral (e.g. unblocking arteries in legs) applications, through 
diagnostic, then interventional uses by radiologists, until finally, it began to displace a proportion of 
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CABG procedures, illustrates the central dynamic of the subversive marketing moment.  We suggested 
earlier that an established market existed around the CABG product.  This product was ‘threatened’ to 
some degree by the emergence of the stent product because some consumers chose the stent over CABG.  
But the stent product didn’t merely diffuse (Rogers, 1962/1995; Dopson, 2005) within this existing 
market; rather it translated (Latour, 1991) the market by becoming more useful for a particular set of 
symptoms than CABG, and also by becoming established as a treatment for symptoms and applications to 
which CABG had never been suited.  This meant that coronary surgeons, established actors in the CABG 
market, were unable to unilaterally prevent the emergence of this new product.   
This instance describes an example of how initially the product is applied to one small, unimportant 
application (e.g. peripheral angioplasty), and because its encroachment into the nearest existing market is 
thus contained, it is tolerated by established actors who benefit from the acceptance of an existing product 
(e.g. CABG).  The difficulty facing these established actors is that, as the new product broadens its appeal 
and range of applications – as it translates both itself and its market – it becomes more established and 
more difficult to suppress.   
However, some restraining of the new product is evident in legal and quasi-legal activities between 
established actors – such as regulatory agents or patent offices – and emergent competitors.  For example, 
in 1992 Boston Scientific and Hewlett-Packard entered an alliance to develop the technology that would 
become known as ‘IVUS’ (intravascular ultrasound) – a product useful for positioning stents.  In 1995, 
Boston Scientific acquired another emergent competitor that was developing that product, only to be 
restrained from completing the deal by the US Federal Trade Commission.  Boston Scientific executives 
felt that Hewlett-Packard had pressured the Commission to intervene.  One senior Boston Scientific 
employee characterized the relationship by suggesting: ‘Little did we know that Hewlett-Packard had 
such phenomenal clout in DC.  They were behind the scenes, really leveraging.’ (Rodengen, 2001, 
pp.164-5).  The deal subsequently went ahead on the condition that some of the IVUS technologies were 
licensed to Hewlett-Packard.  By regulating the degree of control Boston Scientific had over the IVUS 
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product and ensuring that at least two emergent competitors had access to it, this interaction further 
translated both the producers and the emerging market in which they were operating.   
But, while contentious at the time, this could be perceived as part of routine regulatory activities.  
Product-specific legal interactions between emergent competitors and established actors take the form of 
regulatory control.  This regulatory control frequently results from the conflict between the drive for 
market share – which producers experience in order to establish their products as de facto standards 
(Jakobs, 2005; Wonglimpiyarat, 2005) or dominant designs (Tushman and Anderson, 1990) – and the 
need for consumers and wider market actors, in contrast, to restrain this drive in order to maintain pre-
existing markets, meet health and safety regulations, maintain intellectual property rights, and so forth.   
An example of this process relates to the introduction of DESs in the US from 2003 into 2004.  During 
2003, rumours regarding difficulties with Cypher (J&J drug-eluting stent) insertions began to circulate, 
and from 2003 into 2004, J&J engaged in a protracted battle with the FDA, much of it in public, 
attempting to limit the impact of the controversy on Cypher sales.  There were suggestions that the stents 
were causing blood clots to form, leading to heart attacks in the affected patients.  The FDA became 
involved and claimed to know of 34 cases of such clots forming, and 5 deaths occurring5.  They stated 
that the deaths were not necessarily linked to the clots.  J&J and the FDA publicly agreed that the clots 
might not be more frequently encountered than they were with bare metal stents (there were more than 
50,000 implanted Cypher stents at that stage) and that if they were, then the difficulty may have been 
more to do with insertion procedures and post-operative treatments than with the stent design.  This 
reveals that it was the challenges associated with stabilising the new DES product within existing market 
practices that were causing problems.  If DESs (such as the Cypher) had been the established product, 
then the insertion procedures and post-operative treatments would have been tailored to them, and it was 
the speed of translation of these procedures and treatments, to a regime sympathetic to Cypher use, that 
J&J needed to address, while fending off allegations that the Cypher was deficient in some fundamental 
                                                 
5 http://www.oshmanlaw.com/pharmaceutical_litigation/heart_stents.html (accessed 13/04/12) 
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aspect.  This translation was difficult for J&J to manage, as neither the firm nor the FDA could control 
how the device was used.   
In terms of the argument between ‘diffusion’ and ‘translation’, this example illustrates how diffusion is a 
relatively static concept.  Translation, in contrast, allows emergent competitors to perceive a period 
during which changes – within the broader market, and not directly controllable – will have to be made in 
order for its product to become immutable.  Awareness of this phenomenon better equips producers to 
face the challenges associated with new market emergence. 
Regulatory control is perhaps the dominant response of established actors to these market-making 
activities.  The engaged reaction by emergent competitors to this regulatory response contrasts sharply 
with the parallel internecine marketing that occurs between the emergent competitors.  The latter is 
impetuously antagonistic – violent in every sense except for the most literal, while the former is 
emollient, diplomatic, considered.  We propose that there is a tension between these two marketing 
moments, which eventually leads to a more ‘civilised’ marketing moment. 
Civilized Marketing 
The civilized marketing moment describes a set of marketing dynamics within established markets that 
echoes Hirschman’s doux-commerce (‘sweet commerce’) thesis wherein ‘commerce [is] a civilizing 
agent of considerable power and range’ (Hirschman, 1982, p1464).  So, for example, while some price 
competition may be present, aggressive actions – those destructive to the mutually satisfactory 
circumstances – are rare.  We describe this marketing moment as civilized in the sense that Elias used the 
term (see Elias and Jephcott, 1994/2000).  Elias proposed that society comprises a set of interdependency 
networks, which are configured in certain ways at certain times.  He suggested that changes occur to these 
configurations over time, as a result of the activities of the actors within these networks.  These activities 
are influenced by the context within which the network is operating, the circumstances within which the 
individual actors find themselves, and their relative positions to each other.  Asymmetries in power 
between these actors are important, as is the recognition that outcomes of actors’ activities may not be as 
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planned.  Elias’s theory of civilization suggests that actors, who start out as impulsively violent in a 
relatively unstructured environment, become diplomatic, self-restrained actors over time, as the 
environment becomes more structured.   
This move is mirrored in the stent market as the relatively isolated emergent competitors – acting 
impulsively and violently – become progressively engaged in a more complex interdependency network, 
involving existing customers, regulatory agencies, distribution channels, and so forth.  This figurational 
change leads to a more ‘civilised’ market, within which established actors (previously emergent 
competitors) compete using conventional and well-understood tactics (e.g. price competition), in the 
absence of mutually-destructive market-making activities (e.g. repeated, overlapping lawsuits), in order to 
supply a well-understood and accepted product (until recently an emerging product).   
The move to civilized marketing is a gradual change driven by two factors.  The first is that a more 
refined ‘agreement on a set of core elements that define the concept’ (Rosa et al, 1999) comes into being 
between actors.  At this stage, radical product development is no longer required, ownership of the 
product technology has largely been settled, and any incumbent product has been overcome to the extent 
that it will be.  The new product has passed from being a potential solution, through being an alternative 
solution (to an existing one), to being the solution to a defined problem in a defined market – it has 
become ‘blackboxed’.  This term is used by Callon to describe how, as the product becomes more 
involved within a complex interdependency network – as it becomes more accepted and suited to the 
translated environment – it eventually becomes ‘a single point or node in another network’ (Callon, 1991, 
p.153).  This node is the ‘black box’, the contents of which are accepted and which do not need to be 
reconsidered, and which can become a stable, reliable node in another, larger network.  There is, in effect, 
less arguing to do, and that which remains revolves around ‘civilized’ marketing issues, primarily price 
and quantity. 
The second way in which market actors are drawn away from their violently impulsive selves is through a 
growing awareness that it is difficult to determine the effect of any action they might take, or even to 
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select the ‘right’ action.  It may well be that every emergent competitor wants to win the next court case, 
but they are wary of ‘winning’ the race to produce the first/best radioactive stent (a ‘losing’ product).  In 
addition to fitting into Elias’ perspective, this dynamic relates closely to Fligstein’s (1996) view that ‘no 
actor can determine which behaviours will maximize profits… and action is then directed towards the 
creation of stable worlds’ (Fligstein, 1996, p659).  This growing restraint is augmented by the developing 
differences between emergent competitors.  Some, through a combination of incremental sales increases, 
acquisitions and technological improvements, have become larger and stronger.  These asymmetries in 
power lead smaller producers to become more deferential towards larger ones, and the bigger producers’ 
norms increasingly become market norms.  In short, the market becomes established. 
In Schumpeterian terms, the supermarkets have taken over completely from the corner stores, and are 
now exhibiting the same ‘normal’ competitive activities as the corner stores did before them.  Unless 
some new element is injected into the competitive arena, none of the competitors will break the rules.  
Detergent manufacturers will compete on cost, product placement and advertising; department stores will 
compete on price, and on the range and novelty of their wares.  A serious attempt by one producer to 
exclude another from the market would be exceptional.  For the same reasons, legal actions are rarely 
employed once the civilized marketing moment comes into being. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This research leads to three broader conclusions which we now highlight.  Our first conclusion is that 
emergent competitors operate clearly different strategies with respect to directly competing producers and 
established actors in emerging markets.  This conclusion is useful in two regards: it illuminates the 
market-making dynamics between emergent competitors, and it distinguishes these dynamics from those 
between emergent competitors and established actors.  This contrasts with much of the literature which 
has focused heavily on the reaction of established actors to the threats presented by emergent competitors 
(e.g. Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Clemons et al, 1996; Gans et al , 2002; Rothaermel, 2001; Howells, 
2002; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and which has produced terms of such popularity – ‘creative 
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destruction’; ‘disruptive technology’ (Schumpeter, 1942/1976; Ehrnberg, 1995; Christensen 1997; 
Henderson, 2006) – that they may be limiting further insights into this area rather than facilitating them. 
Our second conclusion is that legal activities are dramatically more important in market-making dynamics 
than was previously thought.  The range and scale of legal activities are impressive in themselves, but it is 
the contrast between their nature and that of ‘normal’ legal actions which is fundamental to understanding 
their importance.  Although research into the legal issues surrounding new products is not uncommon, it 
tends to focus on patenting and associated issues (e.g. Archibugi and Pianta, 1996; Brockhoff et al, 1999; 
Maklem, 2005; Pilkington and Dyerson, 2006) rather than on the utilisation of legal methods as front-line 
market-making levers. 
Our research reveals that legal activities between emergent competitors are ruthless and extensive, with a 
series of repeated and overlapping lawsuits, often closely connected to related issues.  The resolution of 
these issues frequently presents an opportunity to resolve a wider set of actions between producers, and 
signals a lull in the legal activities for some months before they are re-activated. 
Legal actions also occur between emergent competitors and established actors, but its nature is quite 
distinct to that exhibited between producers.  In this case, the legal activity takes the form of a sort of 
regulatory restraint applied by established actors to the drive by emergent competitors to achieve market 
share.  Both of these patterns of legal activity represent major marketization dynamics within emerging 
markets. 
Market-making is dynamic in nature – a recognition fundamental to this work – and without the 
longitudinal nature of this research, these dynamics could not have been revealed.  Actor network theory 
considers change (e.g. the introduction of a new product) as a process of translation, and with process in 
mind, we would add a third conclusion.  If what Schumpeter described as ‘creative destruction’ defines 
the overwhelming of an old product by a new, then the process of transforming the identities of a new 
product, and those who encounter it, during its emergence, is quite distinct.  This process – which we will 
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describe as ‘creative construction’ – encompasses the emergence and gradual acceptance of the new 
product.   
Our distinction of this process from Schumpeter’s echoes our earlier contrast between the literature’s 
focus on the reaction of established actors to emergent competitors, rather than the marketization 
dynamics between emergent competitors.  If ‘creative destruction’ represents the process of translating 
from the point of disruption to the point where the new product becomes dominant, then ‘creative 
construction’ represents the process of translation evident at the point of disruption, with the new product 
coming into being.  We’re making this point because, just as it is more interesting to examine the 
relationships between actors than the actors themselves, we feel it is important to examine the nature of 
change between states – i.e. at the point of disruption – rather than the distinctive states evident either 
prior to or following the change.  Introducing the concept of creative construction and distinguishing it 
from creative destruction may help to refine the use of the latter term and to further clarify the issues 
surrounding market-making dynamics at the point of disruption.  
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Firm Boston Scientific Guidant J&J/Cordis Medtronic AVE  Abbott Labs 
(Abbott Vascular 
Devices) 
Founded 1979 1994 1887 (J&J), 1959 
(Cordis) 
1949 (Medtronic), 
1991 (AVE) 
1888 (Abbott Labs, 
1984 
Biocompatibles 
Founder John Abele, Peter 
Nicholas. 
Eli Lilly spin-off. Robert, James and 
Edward Johnson 
(J&J) 
Earl Bakken, 
Palmer 
Hermundslie. 
Dr. Wallace Calvin 
Abbott.  Prof. 
Dennis Chapman 
(Biocompatibles) 
HQ Natick, 
Massachusetts  
Indianapolis  New Jersey (J&J), 
Miami (Cordis) 
Minneapolis  Chicago  
Activities Less invasive 
medical devices. 
Cardiovascular 
medical products. 
Less invasive 
treatment of 
vascular disease. 
(Cordis) 
Treatment of 
chronic disease 
especially heart 
disease. 
Global 
pharmaceuticals, 
nutritionals, and 
medical products, 
incl. diagnostics 
and cardiovascular 
devices. 
Divisions Two operating 
groups 
(Cardiovascular 
and Endosurgery) 
marketed through 
6 divisions.  
EP Technologies. 
Medi-tech. 
Scimed. 
Target. 
Microvasive 
Endoscopy. 
Microvasive 
Urology. 
Cardiac Rhythm 
Management. 
Vascular 
Intervention. 
Cardiac Surgery. 
Endovascular 
Solutions. 
1. Cardiology 
2. Endovascular 
3. Neurovascular 
4. Biosense 
Webster Inc. 
(Cordis) 
1.Cardiac Rhythm 
Management 
2.Cardiac Surgery 
3.Vascular 
4.Neurological and 
Diabetes 
5.Spinal, ENT and 
SNT 
Two operating 
groups 
(Pharmaceutical 
Products and 
Medical Products) 
the former 
marketed through 
several divisions 
including Ross 
Products and 
Abbott 
International, the 
latter through 
several divisions 
including Abbott 
Diagnostics and 
Abbott Vascular 
Devices. 
Employee 
Numbers 
15,000 12,000+ 5,300 (Cordis) 
110,000 (J&J) 
32,000 (Medtronic) 55,000+ (Abbott 
Labs) 
Sites ‘Represented in 
40+countries 
worldwide. 
19 57 countries Worldwide 120 worldwide 
Market 
Focus 
Global Global 175countries+ 
worldwide 
120+ countries 
worldwide 
130+ countries 
worldwide 
Total 
Assets  
$5.7B $4.64B $48.26B (J&J) $12.32B 
(Medtronic) 
$26.72B (Abbott 
Labs) 
Revenue  $3.48B $3.7B $14.9B (J&J 
‘Medical Devices 
and Diagnostics’) 
$41.86B (J&J) 
$7.665B 
(Medtronic) 
$19.7B (Abbott 
Labs) $185 million 
(AVD) 
R&D 
Expenses  
$452M (12.98%) $518M (14.00%) $4,684M  (11.18%) 
(J&J) 
$749M  
(9.77%) 
$1,733M (8.79%) 
(Abbott Labs) 
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Table1: Dominant Stent Market Competitors (2003) 
 
 
Tabl
e 2: 
Anal
ytica
l 
Fra
me 
 Product Legal Relationships Market 
Mutable 
Marketing 
Exciting and new.  
Proving ground.  
Single application. 
Non-issue. Personal, tolerance 
between a few, 
influential actors. 
Vague, tentative 
‘market’.  Emergent 
competitors 
unfocused. 
Regulatory issues  
unclear. 
     
Internecine 
Marketing 
Established as 
viable. 
Super-aggressive 
lever, not just 
principled response 
of last resort to 
infringements. 
Mutually 
antagonistic 
creation of doubles. 
Acquisition feeding 
frenzy.  Products 
and producers 
targeted. 
Subversive 
Marketing 
Ongoing market 
translation 
activities. 
Regulatory restraint. Deferential. Swingeing market-
share shifts.  
Different consumers 
and product 
applications. 
     
Civilized 
Marketing 
Standardised, 
commoditized, 
trusted in an 
application, black-
boxed, 
punctualised. 
Infrequent, 
exceptional. 
Stable. Established.  Large 
producers identified 
with product.  Slow 
expansion of 
market. 
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Date Activity 
1997 Angiotech signs co-exclusive agreement with Boston Scientific and 
Cook to develop Paclitaxel-coated devices. 
November 2001 Guidant’s ‘Action’ trial for Antinomycin-coated devices enrolled. 
Autumn 2001 Cook and Guidant agree use of Paclitaxel. 
Autumn 2001 Boston Scientific files for arbitration regarding Guidant/Cook 
agreement. 
December 2001 Arbitration fails and dispute is transferred to court. 
Early 2002 Cook ‘Elutes’ trial enrolled. 
March 2002 ‘Action’ trial cancelled. 
March 2002 Guidant’s ‘Deliver’ trial for Paclitaxel-coated devices enrolled. 
June 2002 Cook/Guidant Paclitaxel agreement ruled against in court. 
Summer 2002 Guidant bid to acquire Cook. 
October 2002 Guidant legally restrained from using any benefit from previous Cook 
alliance.  Guidant appeals. 
November 2002 Guidant’s appeal rejected. 
January 2003 Guidant triggers ‘get-out’ clause in Cook acquisition. 
 
Table 3: Guidant's drug-eluting stent activities 
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Figure 1: Emergence of Stent Product 
2003 
 
First drug-
eluting 
coronary 
stents 
launched in 
US. 
1929 
 
Human heart 
catheterized 
for first time. 
1911 
 
Glass tubes 
inserted into 
dogs’ arteries 
– early 
‘stents’. 
 
1964 
 
Human leg 
artery 
unblocked 
via 
angioplasty. 
1973 
 
Human 
artery 
dilated 
with 
balloon. 
1977 
 
Coronary 
artery 
dilated 
with 
balloon. 
 
1994 
 
First 
coronary 
stent 
approved 
in US. 
1997 
 
Competing 
coronary 
stents 
launched. 
       1941 
 
First 
diagnostic use 
of cardiac  
catheterization 
in US. 
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Figure 2: US PTCA vs. CABG Trends (Males per 100,000 of the population, 1994 - 2000) 
(Adapted from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/healthcare.pdf) 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006  J&J acquires 
Conor MedSystems 
1996 Medtronic 
acquires InStent and 
AneuRx 
1995 Medtronic 
acquires Micro 
Interventional Systems 
and PS Medical 
1999 Guidant acquires 
Cardiothoracic Systems, 
and divests its General 
Surgery division. 
1998 Guidant 
acquires 
Intermedics 
1997 Guidant acquires 
Neocardia LLC and 
Endovascular 
Technologies 
1998 Medtronic 
acquires  World 
Medical 
Manufacturing Inc. 
2001 Guidant signs 
agreement with Cook to 
access Paclitaxel 
2004 BSX acquires 
exclusive rights to 
Paclitaxel 
2002 Medtronic and 
Abbott Labs cross-license 
stent and drug 
technologies 
2002 Abbott Labs 
acquire BioCompatibles 
stent and coating 
technologies 
2003 Abbott Labs 
acquire Jomed 
1998 AVE 
acquires  Bard’s 
catheter business 
1999 Medtronic acquires        
    AVE 
2000 Medtronic 
acquires Percusurge 
2001 Medtronic sign worldwide 
exclusive agreement with AVI 
Biopharm for Resten NG 
1996 J&J 
acquire Cordis  
2006   J&J loses 
Guidant auction 
1992 BSX and HP sign 
IVUS alliance 
1997 BSX signs co-
exclusive agreement with 
Angiotech and Cook 
2001 BSX acquires 
Interventional Technologies 
Inc., Embolic Protection Inc.,, 
Catheter Innovation Inc., 
Quanam Medical Corp., Cardiac 
Pathways Corp., Radio 
Therapeutics Corp., and Smart 
Therapeutics Inc. 
1995 Guidant acquires 
Danimed GmBH 
2000 Guidant acquires 
Impulse Dynamics 
2003 Guidant walk away 
from Cook acquisition 
2004 Guidant/J&J Strategic Alliance 
2005   J&J expresses doubt about 
Guidant acquisition 
2006   BSX acquires Guidant 
2000 
2005 
BSX(& Guidant) J&J/Cordis Medtronic/Abbott 
Labs strategic alliance 
1995 
1990 
1995 BSX licenses Medinol 
stent technology and signs 
non-vascular IVUS alliance 
with B&K Medical.   
BSX acquires 
Cardiovascular Imaging 
Systems, Scimed, Vesica 
Inc., Meadox Medicals Inc., 
Heart Technology, and EPT, 
gaining ‘Strategic Mass’. 
Boston Scientific 
Guidant 
founded 1994 
Abbott 
Labs 
Medtronic J&J 
AVE 
founded 1991 
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Figure 3: Producer Relationships during Internecine Marketing Moment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guidant 
launch 
MultiLink. 
 
J&J/Cordis sue 
Guidant for 
infringing 
Palmaz/Schatz 
patent. 
 
J&J/Cordi
s sue 
Guidant 
for 
infringing 
Pinchuk 
patent. 
 
Medtronic sue Guidant for 
infringing Wiktor patent. 
 
Medtronic 
and 
J&J/Cordis 
cross-
license 
patents. 
 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Feb, ’98 Medtronic 
sue Guidant again 
(stent patents). 
 
April, ’98 Medtronic 
sue Guidant again 
(stent patents). 
 
July, ’99 Medtronic sue Boston 
Scientific for infringing Wiktor patent. 
 
Guidant and J&J/Cordis dismiss all outstanding 
litigation and cross-license patents.  Payments 
referred to arbitrator.  Guidant anticipates 
payment of between $125 and $400 million. 
 
Boston Scientific sue 
Medtronic for infringing rapid-
exchange catheter patent.  
Medtronic demands arbitration. 
 
Nov, ’00 Medtronic 
orderd to pay 
J&J/Cordis $271 
million damages.  
  
 
Medinol sue 
Boston Scientific 
for ‘theft’ of its 
technology. 
 
Boston Scientific  
counter-sues, 
claiming delay and 
obstructive 
behaviour. 
 
Dec, ’00 Boston Scientific ordered to 
pay J&J/Cordis $324 million 
damages.  Boston Scientific appeals. 
2001 
2002 
July, ’01 Medtronic forced out of 
US rapid-exchange market.  
Medtronic pays Boston Scientific 
$175 million and the firms cross-
license patents. 
 
March, ’02 $324 
million order set 
aside.  Date set for 
new trial. 
 
March, ’02 $271 
million order 
overturned. 
 
2003 
June, ’03 
Boston 
Scientific 
infringes 
Medinol 
German  
patent. 
 
July, ’03 J&J/Cordis BX Velocity 
infringes Medinol patent.  
Ordered to remove from Dutch 
market within 48 hours. 
 
July, ’03 German  
patent office finds 
for Medinol, against 
Boston Scientific and 
J&J/Cordis. 
 
Ongoing 
legal jousting 
in US and 
Israeli courts. 
Aug, ’03 
Arbitrator’s final 
ruling. Guidant must 
pay J&J/Cordis 
$425 million. 
 
Aug, ’03 J&J/Cordis 
request that Cypher be 
removed from order 
rejected. 
 
Aug, ’03 $271 million 
reversal reversed. 
 
Sept, ’03 Dutch court rejects Boston 
Scientific claim that Medinol patent 
infringes Boston patent.  Invalidates 
the Boston patent. 
 
Dec, ’03 Dutch court orders Boston 
Scientific to cease sales of Express and 
Taxus due to infringement of Medinol 
patent. 
 Jan, ’04 
J&J/Cordis 
sues Boston 
Scientific 
claiming 
Express2 
infringes 
patent. 
 
Feb, ’04 Guidant  
and Boston 
Scientific agree 
to settle all 
outstanding 
patent litigation. 
 
Feb, ’04 Guidant  
and J&J/Cordis 
agree to settle all 
outstanding 
patent litigation. 
 
April, ’04 Dutch ruling from December 
’03 reversed in Boston Scientific’s 
favour.  Ruling final and cannot be 
appealed. 
 
April, ’04 Dutch court issues ‘anti-
suit’ injunction against Medinol. 
 
March, ’05 Court finds 
the Boston Scientific NIR 
stent infringes 
J&J/Cordis patent.  
J&J/Cordis claim original 
$324 million, plus 
interest. 
 
Sept, ’05 Boston 
Scientific settles all 
outstanding litigation 
with Medinol for a 
payment of $750 
million. 
 
July, ’05 Court 
rules J&J/Cordis 
stent products 
infringe Boston 
Scientific patents.   
 
June, ’05 Dutch court rules J&J/Cordis stent 
products infringe Boston Scientific balloon 
catheter patent.  Orders products no longer 
may be produced or sold in Holland. 
 
Autumn, ’05 Regardless, Medinol launches 
further actions against Boston Scientific, e.g., 
in Switzerland, based on newer Liberte and 
Taxus-Liberte stents. 
 
2004 
2005 June, ’05 Court 
rules several Boston 
Scientific stent 
products infringe 
J&J/Cordis patents.  
J&J/Cordis seek 
$844 million 
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Figure 4: Legal Activities during Internecine Marketing Moment 
 
 
